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This commentary raises questions about the degree to which global innovation indicators
enable us to understand the historical dynamics of innovation in Canada, and about future
directions for Canadian innovation policy. By focusing on the automotive and
telecommunications sectors, two currently troubled Canadian industries with completely
different histories, some of the major successes and mistakes of Canadian industrial policy
are assessed critically. The conclusion is that the innovation problem in Canada has less to
do with capabilities or opportunities, than with recent tendencies not to follow through
when ambitious innovation initiatives in specific industries could be transformed into new
national "engines of growth". 
THE COUNCIL OF CANADIAN ACADEMIES
(CCA) is rendering an invaluable service to the
Canadian public. Over a very short period, the
CCA has produced several of the most pene-
trating and useful analyses of the state of Cana-
dian research and innovation to have appeared
in a very long time. The most recent report,
entitled Innovation and Business Strategy: Why
Canada Falls Short and released on April 29,
2009 by the Expert Panel on Business Innova-
tion in Canada, is certainly among them.
Returning to Canada three years ago, after
many years away, I was dismayed at how far
general political and public awareness of the
vital importance of research and innovation had
deteriorated, and how, despite several new and
long overdue initiatives, Canadians are still fail-
ing to respond positively to many of their
chronic industrial challenges. The ‘crisis’ we
now face may have been precipitated by finan-
cial adventurism elsewhere, but it has been
brewing in our midst for decades.
Responsibility for these failures has been laid
at many doorsteps. The university system in par-
ticular (unfairly in my view but with its own con-
nivance to be sure) has often been singled out for
its supposed underperformance in transferring
new knowledge to the market. Government has
been blamed for too much red tape on the one
hand and too little intervention on the other.
Business has been blamed for timidity and reluc-
tance to invest. Organized labor has been
blamed for preserving structural obstacles to
change. The list goes on and on, and, indeed,
none of the accused is entirely blameless.
But as the Panel rightly emphasizes, ulti-
mately, the responsibility for innovation in busi-
ness lies with business. And in this regard, it is a
simple fact that Canadian business as a whole —
particularly our largest industries — never looks
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to be more than a fair-to-middling performer in
the international innovation league tables.
There is no point in trying to argue with the sta-
tistics presented in this report. They say what
they say and the same indicators are applied to
every OECD country. We cannot wriggle free
from their implications with special pleading.
Nevertheless, the crucial task is to interpret
these indicators such that creative solutions can
emerge that do take full account of Canada’s own
unique circumstances and history. One very
important contribution of the CCA report is that
it amplifies and contextualizes many of the com-
parative statistics such that a far more nuanced
picture emerges of Canada’s innovation profile.
Early on, the report suggests that our national
innovation “problem” is extremely broad in
scope, stating that “The causes of Canada’s innova-
tion deficiency must run deep in the nature of the
economy, and perhaps in Canadian society as well.” I
fully agree. The more I have learned since my
repatriation, the more I have become convinced
that the crux of our problem — and I am not sure
that the Panel’s report entirely pins down what
that problem is — lies more in our experience
and history than in our scientific, technological
or business capabilities as such. One of the most
positive and refreshing aspects of this report is
that the Panel endeavors to get under the skin of
these dry and rather abstract indicators and,
with Cassius, entertains the possibility that our
fault lies not in our stars but in ourselves.
The Panel’s report is carefully researched,
comprehensive, extensive and detailed. It is
also presented critically and fairly. I am con-
tent to accept the validity of most of the evi-
dence and analysis it contains. Instead, I will
comment in two areas where I remain skepti-
cal. The first concerns the degree to which
this body of evidence really enables us to
understand the dynamics of innovation in the
Canadian experience. The second concerns
what to do about it. Can we become more
innovative through more R&D investment,
tax breaks and university patenting? Somehow
I don’t think so. But with the reader’s indul-
gence, I will begin with a story.
A Tale of Two Industries
In the past few months Canadians have wit-
nessed serious declines in two of our once stron-
gest industries — automobiles and
telecommunications. These two industries have
completely opposite profiles in Canadian indus-
trial history, and it occurs to me that the way
Canada is responding, or not, to their tribula-
tions is highly indicative of our past and present
attitudes towards industrial evolution and inno-
vation. It is also indicative of the historical
strengths as well as weaknesses of Canadian pub-
lic policy in leveraging large technologically-
intensive industries into what I will call national
“engines of growth.”
In the early 20th century, Canada had a strong
domestic automobile industry which was highly
innovative, e.g. the saloon car, which eventually
became the standard platform for the entire
industry globally, was a Canadian innovation.
Sadly, Canadian significance as an independent
force in the automobile industry dwindled
steadily throughout the 20th century. Today, the
structural importance of this industry to Can-
ada’s economy is based primarily on wages. The
fate of thousands of Canadian auto workers and
many more besides now lies entirely outside of
Canada.
Our auto sector is a prime (though by no
means the only) example of a Canadian industry
in which control over the real means of wealth
production — to design the product and to make
the market — shifted out of the country and
where its “engine” function was perceived by
successive generations of policy makers as an
employment stabilization strategy rather than
an industrial strategy. Thousands of Canadians
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lective failure of virtually every institution
involved with this industry since the 1950s to
deal with this social and economic time-bomb. If
that sounds harsh, it is meant to be.
On the other hand, and contrary to the popu-
lar mythology that Alexander Graham Bell was
somehow a Canadian (he wasn’t) and that the
telephone was a Canadian invention (it wasn’t),
Canada was a marginal player in the telecommu-
nication industry until the 1960s. But, through
smart business planning, effective coordination
with government agencies and labs, productive
deployment of Canada’s brightest young gradu-
ates, and strategic exploitation of unique and
time-sensitive market conditions in the United
States, by the late 1970s Canada was as impor-
tant a source of innovation and productivity in
this industry as any country in the world. In
terms of business expenditure on research and
development (BERD), Nortel is probably Can-
ada’s one and only indigenous company ever to
be a global leader in every single category of
innovation statistic. At one time it was estimated
that this single company was responsible for a
significant portion of all of the R&D performed
in Canada. Moreover, a huge spillover of new
Canadian IT-based enterprises emerged.
Despite many us and downs, Canadian compa-
nies continue to lead in many of these markets,
and we are still generating them (e.g. RIM and
Smart Technologies).
Our IT and telecommunication sector is a
prime (although by no means the only) example
of a Canadian industry in which considerable
control over product design and market-making
both emerged in Canada and stayed in Canada.
Even when, as inevitably always happens, Nortel
globalized its R&D, the company continued to
play a structural role in anchoring our IT and
telecom industry. But just as importantly, the
“engine” function of this industry was perceived
by policy makers in terms first of an industrial
strategy, in the expectation that it would become a
significant generator of sustainable jobs (which
by-and-large it still is). Nortel employees likewise
face an uncertain future, but this is due to ques-
tionable business decisions by this particular
company. An unusual occurrence? The difference
is that the fate of these workers is not irrevocably
sealed by systemic institutional failure. The sec-
tor will continue to create value in Canada, even
if Nortel itself plays a diminishing role.
Another part of our national mythology is that
because of our close structural ties to the US
economy, we are condemned to be a branch-
plant economy. But the story of these two indus-
tries illustrates that proximity to US markets can
be exploited to our advantage as well as to our
disadvantage. In particular, they demonstrate
the dangers of relying upon foreign direct
investment (FDI) to stimulate domestic innova-
tion, which to my horror is becoming a promi-
nent plank in most federal and provincial
innovation strategies (inchoate as most of them
are). FDI can work, but it works best if a country
that is open to FDI is also a significant exporter
of FDI. That makes the difference between
being a branch plant and a global player.
Thus, in terms of trying to define Canada’s
innovation “problem”, I have been struck in par-
ticular by the gross imbalance in public percep-
tion between the current crisis at General
Motors compared to the crisis at Nortel. Can-
ada’s declining position in the auto sector, where
we have not had a significant home-grown stake
in innovation since the 1920s, is daily news. The
debate is not whether to invest billions of dollars
to preserve jobs, but how many billions. In stark
contrast, Nortel was pretty much a one day story.
To my knowledge nobody has seriously pro-
posed financial support for this company or this
industry. And, indeed, maybe this is not neces-
sary for the best of reasons.
For me, the case of the auto industry exempli-
fies all of the things that Canadian businesses
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and the creation of high-value knowledge-based
new enterprise. The auto industry has far too
many analogues. On the other hand, the case of
the telecommunication industry, at least until
recently, represents most of the right things.
And we have done basically some of these ‘right’
things in several other industrial areas as well —
aerospace, canola and steam-assisted gravity
drainage (SAGD) come immediately to mind. So
we cannot let ourselves off the hook by claiming
that we need to learn to innovate in order to
compete more effectively in domestic and global
markets. The problem is more serious and sys-
temic than that.
What Do the Indicators 
Actually Say About Canada?
One of the few things that I find problematic
about the Panel’s report is that it takes a very
conventional view of what innovation is and how
it works. For example, it does not pursue some
of the more intriguing new ideas about innova-
tion as a social practice or about the dynamic
properties of innovation, most of which come
from outside mainstream economics. Indeed,
the report casts innovation in rather linear terms
as a process of finding solutions to problems.
But surely innovation also creates problems. As
Schumpeter pointed out a century ago, entrepre-
neurs do not respond to demand — they create it!
As such, the real risk lies not with the entrepre-
neur, but with the society that accepts the risk.
Thus, the feedbacks from innovation are always
diverse and unpredictable, yielding unintended
outcomes, some of which turn out to be huge
intractable problems — I need only mention our
oil dependency. We might even claim that inno-
vation drives growth by never quite solving any-
thing, thus always seeding the field from which
some other new idea or practice can emerge.
This observation plays into my nagging doubts
about how useful it is to think about innovation
too exclusively as an ‘economic’ phenomenon
(responsive mainly to abstract economic stimuli),
or to associate it as exclusively with technology as
has become common practice. Thus, I find that
although the report is forthright in exposing the
limitations of the standard set of economically-
oriented innovation indicators as deployed in the
OECD countries, it is nevertheless drafted
mostly in the same conceptual framework from
which these indicators emerged.
Although the Panel points out that innovation
is about much more than technology, their
report still associates it more closely with tech-
nology than with any other factor. This is diffi-
cult not to do given that virtually all of the
standard indicators in the OECD framework —
R&D, patents, technology investment and
highly qualified personnel (HQP) — are over-
whelmingly oriented to technology.
But this is not to say that the R&D-oriented
indicators do not tell us anything or that what
they tell us is inconsistent with the two stories as
told above. In the first place, criticism of these
indicators often misses a crucial point. As spelled
out clearly in the Frascatti definition, R&D as a
proportion of total industrial or national output
was intended originally to be an indicator of
human capital. Or more specifically, to show
changes in the ratio of value-creating human
capital to value-utilizing wage labour. Both are
necessary, but serve different functions.
As virtually by definition innovation is the
product of human capital, gross expenditures on
research and development (GERD), BERD etc.
are extremely powerful indicators of innovation
potential, if perhaps not of actual innovation
performance. And potential is extraordinarily
important. What you know how to do is as
important as what you do. Thus, the GERD
score can indicate change in the national stock
of human capital. But much more importantly,
changes in GERD when compared with other
indicators can indicate how effectively human
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GERD score compared to the post-secondary
graduation rate may indicate that the human
capital stock is under-deployed; i.e. that workers
capable of creating new value are employed in
sectors that are not creating new value.
Thus, for me, the most important single
exhibits in the report are Table 1 Chart 5 (in the
accompanying article), which together tell us
much about the relative R&D-intensity of key
Canadian economic sectors. It is usually reck-
oned that 80-plus percent of global R&D expen-
diture is anchored in only about a dozen
industries. All of these industries have a pres-
ence in Canada. Together, they sustain a high
portion of Canadian jobs. And yet, as these
tables indicate, only the aerospace, information
technology and bio-medical industries re-invest
substantial amounts of revenue in R&D that is
performed in Canada.
So how does this relate to our stories? Well,
globally, for example, the auto industry normally
ranks towards the very top in R&D-intensity, but
the Canadian contribution is insignificant. On
the other hand, aerospace, IT and bio-medicine
rank highly both globally and in Canada. But is it
significant that we appear to be good R&D per-
formers in only three sectors? Yes and no. It is not
good that we deploy so few human resources in
the auto and other manufacturing industries
which pay such a large part of the wage bill. But
other than that, Canada is not unique in having
most of its R&D centered in just a few of the top
dozen or so R&D-intensive sectors.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with
national R&D specialization and most OECD
countries are even more specialized than Canada.
The real issue is the extent to which innovation is
endemic throughout the entire national indus-
trial spectrum, irrespective of how much R&D
we produce ourselves or in which sectors we pro-
duce it. Thus, it is important to consider if and
how those industries in which we have strong
domestic R&D profiles are integrated with other
sectors. It is also important to understand the role
of knowledge imports and exports in our indus-
trial system (whether between companies, sectors
or countries) and to assess national capabilities to
absorb knowledge as well as to produce it.
But this means that we have to step beyond the
standard indicators and look a lot more closely
at the knowledge composition of companies that
are not R&D intensive. The real problem with
the R&D or technology focus is that inevitably it
casts the innovation issue in terms of those rela-
tively few industries whose business and invest-
ment models are oriented to a constant flow of
new products. For most of these companies,
technology in some form is their final product.
But most companies are not R&D intensive and
there is no reason for them to be. They are cap-
ital intensive, acquiring their technology
through procurement and deploying this tech-
nology as an intermediate good — a means to
some other end. But this does not mean that
they do not also innovate or that the return from
their innovations is any less significant.
Especially given Canada’s industrial history
and composition, surely the most serious omis-
sion in the report concerns the resource indus-
tries. It is easy to dismiss these industries as
relics of the ‘old economy’; part of the problem
rather than the solution. And in some cases, for-
estry being a particularly egregious example, it
can be demonstrated that Canada has declined
significantly as a global source of innovation.
But the issue is far bigger than this. What do we
actually know about the innovation system in
these industries? Actually, not very much. We
know that they do some conventional laboratory-
based R&D, but that they ramp it up and down
intermittently and that normally R&D is not a
main plank in their strategies. But we also know
that in most cases, even though the product
remains an undifferentiated commodity, the pro-
cess of financing, discovering, extracting, pro-
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resource products is radically different than it was
even a few years ago. What we need to know is if,
how and to what extent Canadian companies have
contributed to this innovation process. We also
need to know about the spillovers.
The problem is that capturing the innovation
dynamics of the capital-intensive part of the econ-
omy is far less straightforward than measuring the
production and application of technology. As a
result, innovative activities in most of our indus-
tries — particularly services and natural resources
— remain all but invisible to the indicators.
I find it particularly significant in this context
that Canadians figured out how to manufacture
oil from sand and turn it into a business. This
was as major an innovation as any in our history.
Canadians also learned to turn a toxic seed into
an oil that is both edible and burnable. Another
first. Unfortunately, it is also significant that
Canadians evacuated the innovation playing
field when it came to mitigating the environ-
mental and social impacts of these innovations
and to adding yet further value to the resources
themselves. Thus, our oil sand developments are
held hostage to changing environmental atti-
tudes, and our canola is shipped offshore for
transformation into bio-fuels.
These examples and many more like them
underpin my final criticism of the report itself,
which concerns its narrow (at least in my view)
focus on productivity. Certainly innovation can
drive productivity, but surely it also matters
where productivity increases occur. To return to
my stories, I really do not think it matters that for
whatever reasons high fuel consumption cars are
produced more efficiently in Canada than else-
where. For a multitude of interconnected reasons
that go well beyond greenhouse gas emissions,
this product paradigm is steadily coming to an
end. I dispute entirely the claim in the report that
the main form of innovation in our auto sector
has been in process. There is a huge difference
between tweaking the normal line of efficiency
management (which incidentally can also require
significant investment) and incremental innova-
tion which is a source of new value.
Where innovation is concerned, whether rad-
ical or incremental, surely productivity is a red
herring unless it is positioned on the cusp of
some new paradigm. Canada needs to become
more productive, but in new markets in which
we can carve out high value niches. We desper-
ately need to go further down the road with
industries that break out of paradigms than we
do at present. But to be fair to workers in our
many sunset industries, we also need to figure
out how to transpose the knowledge about how
to be productive that Canadian workers may
have achieved in the manufacturing plants and
elsewhere to industries in which we can carve
out a higher value stake — where Canadians
design the products and make the markets.
What Is Our “Problem” 
and Are We Fixing It?
It seems to me that the real nature of our inno-
vation “problem” is that Canadians know per-
fectly well how to innovate, but, for a multitude
of reasons, as a society we do not do choose to
accept the risks of innovation as often as we
could. We do not stay with our successful
“engines of growth” as their learning curves
steepen in response to competition and chang-
ing market conditions, and we remain more
committed to preserving jobs in sunset indus-
tries than to creating jobs in sunrise industries.
This says a lot to me about our historical ‘atti-
tude’ to industrial development in Canada. It
says that over our history we have received much
positive feedback from not exploiting opportu-
nities to innovate. We have become very good at
creating a high quality of life by leveraging
inputs from elsewhere. As a seasoned reader of
the innovation ‘tealeaves’, this is what jumps out
at me from our profile in the productivity and
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taking is to assume that this strategy will con-
tinue to work. And as the Panel is well aware, for
the first time in our history, irrespective of the
outcome of the current financial debacle, the
signs are not good.
So what is missing in our ‘innovation system’?
Although I would not quibble with most of the
Panel’s conclusions, I was rather disappointed
that they were so short on solutions. In the end,
I found myself asking ‘What measures do I see in
other OECD countries that I do not see in Can-
ada?’
Well, mostly I see the same things. Every gov-
ernment in the OECD hopes that by increasing
investments in education and R&D, and creat-
ing positive fiscal climates, innovation will
increase and sustainable prosperity will gear up.
But of course, everybody can read the same
league tables and most take exactly the same
actions. Thus, we easily get caught in a ‘Red
Queen’ effect where everybody runs like mad
just to stand still. And indeed, with only a few
exceptions now and again, most countries per-
form pretty much the same in all of the tables
from year to year. Even the US is ‘best-in-show’
on only a few of them. Japan always does
superbly on all of them and yet the Japanese
economy has been in the tank for at least a
decade. Perhaps we should not expect that a
change in our position on the tables will indicate
progress in meeting our challenges.
What is missing in Canada at this moment,
and the Panel gives little guidance here, is pre-
cisely that crucial sense of ‘system’ in the inter-
actions between the various institutions that
play different roles in the innovation process —
chiefly business, government and the educa-
tional sector. Whether by design or practice,
most major OECD economies succeed in coor-
dinating these resources such that they generate
new industries, not just pockets of activities. In
the past, Canada has succeeded with this strat-
egy also. So what happened?
Surely part of the current problem is the evo-
lution of our cranky constitution — the ‘factor
10 dilution’ as I have come to call it. Unlike the
situation in some other federated countries (e.g.
Germany or the United States), there are few if
any mechanisms in Canada to aggregate our lim-
ited resources to support bottom-up innovation
initiatives from industries that have a presence
in more than one province. Instead, in virtually
every key knowledge-intensive sector, there are
federal initiatives and typically dozens of pro-
vincial initiatives. Nothing is connected or con-
nectable, and the best we often achieve is that
everybody gets really good at doing a part of not
very much.
Secondly, Canadian governments seem to have a
touchingly quaint faith in the sufficiency of fiscal
measures to stimulate innovation. Tax incentives
are one way of stimulating R&D in some cases in a
few industries. But no innovation is entirely depen-
dent upon R&D (many are not dependent upon it
at all), and surely no smart business ever does R&D
because they get a tax break. Moreover, fiscal poli-
cies often just reward patching holes in sinking
ships. That this represents the largest share of what
government actually does about innovation, our
tax credit program embodies our innovation policy
problem.
But thirdly and most importantly, the public
sector focus in Canada has become too focused
on research, and not nearly focused enough on
development. Of all the terms in the innovation
equation, research has the lowest risk for gov-
ernments and public agencies for the simple rea-
son that it is a step removed from anything to do
with business. But as the Panel also notes
(maybe more by implication), when it comes to
national economic performance, and to innova-
tion in particular, business and government are
never very far apart. The orthodox economic
policy catechism mandates that government has
no business engaging in or with business. This is
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seems to harbor the only true believers in this
doctrine who also practice it.
At this point it is appropriate to close by not-
ing that virtually all of our major past successes
in creating high-value world-beating innovative
industries have been engineered by visionary
people in all branches of Canadian society who
are not worried by doctrine. Such is the case also
among our chief competitors. Our emerging
‘culture of accountability’ is not symmetrical
with the realities of entrepreneurship or with
the need for government occasionally to take
some of the same kinds of risks as businesses take
— with the same consequences.
Congratulations to the Panel for bringing all
of these and many more issues into relief. I very
much hope that their report will be received by
industry, government and the academy with the
seriousness it deserves. And more importantly, I
hope it spurs somebody to action.